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Women’s underrepresentation in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics
(STEM) fields is a prominent concern in our society and many others. Closer
inspection of this phenomenon reveals a more nuanced picture, however, with women
achieving parity with men at the Ph.D. level in certain STEM fields, while also
being underrepresented in some non-STEM fields. It is important to consider and
provide an account of this field-by-field variability. The field-specific ability beliefs (FAB)
hypothesis aims to provide such an account, proposing that women are likely to be
underrepresented in fields thought to require raw intellectual talent—a sort of talent
that women are stereotyped to possess less of than men. In two studies, we provide
evidence for the FAB hypothesis, demonstrating that the academic fields believed by
laypeople to require brilliance are also the fields with lower female representation. We
also found that the FABs of participants with college-level exposure to a field were
more predictive of its female representation than those of participants without college
exposure, presumably because the former beliefs mirror more closely those of the field’s
practitioners (the direct “gatekeepers”). Moreover, the FABs of participants with college
exposure to a field predicted the magnitude of the field’s gender gap above and beyond
their beliefs about the level of mathematical and verbal skills required. Finally, we found
that beliefs about the importance of brilliance to success in a field may predict its female
representation in part by fostering the impression that the field demands solitary work
and competition with others. These results suggest new solutions for enhancing diversity
within STEM and across the academic spectrum.
Keywords: gender, stem, lay theories of success, field-specific ability beliefs, diversity in academia
Introduction
A recent article in Scientiﬁc American Mind begins: “Try this simple thought experiment. Name
10 female geniuses from any period of history. Odds are you ran out of names pretty quickly”
(Upson and Friedman, 2012, p. 63). The thought experiment can be adapted: try to name 10 female
ﬁgures in popular culture who—like Sherlock Holmes, Dr. House, or Will Hunting—are charac-
terized by their innate brilliance, their raw intellectual ﬁrepower. As before, one rapidly runs out
of names. Whatever the cause, the message is clear: women are not culturally associated with such
inherent gifts of genius (Bennett, 1996, 1997, 2000; Tiedemann, 2000; Rammstedt and Rammsayer,
2002; Furnham et al., 2006; Kirkcaldy et al., 2007; Upson and Friedman, 2012; Lecklider, 2013;
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Stephens-Davidowitz, 2014). The consequences of this stereotype
are likely wide-ranging. In the current study, we focus on one
of these consequences, asking whether such a pervasive cultural
message might have a role in shaping individuals’ academic and
career paths. Speciﬁcally, if it is widely believed that men tend
to possess more intellectual ability than women, then women
may be discouraged from entering into ﬁelds that are thought to
require this ability. We call this the ﬁeld-speciﬁc ability beliefs
(FAB) hypothesis (Figure 1): the more a ﬁeld is believed to require
raw brilliance, the fewer the women (Leslie and Cimpian et al.,
2015). We test this hypothesis in the context of gender gaps in
academia, investigating whether these gaps are predicted by how
much laypeople assume that success in various ﬁelds rests on raw
ability.
Gender disparity in academia has been a generative topic
of research for many years, with contemporary focus on this
issue largely centering on men’s and women’s participation in
(natural) sciences, technology, engineering, and mathematics
(STEM). The general phenomenon is clear: on average, female
representation in STEM ﬁelds (particularly those that are math-
intensive) is lower than in the social sciences and humanities
(SocSci/Hum). Though the magnitude of this gap has largely
decreased across the last several decades, the diﬀerence is still reli-
able, prompting a number of eﬀorts to explain it (for reviews, see
Ceci and Williams, 2007; Ceci et al., 2009, 2014; Hill et al., 2010).
The low number of women in STEM is indeed of real
concern. However, it is also important to observe that there
is at least as much variation in female representation within
STEM and SocSci/Hum as there is between them. For instance,
when examining the number of recent doctoral degrees earned
by women in the U.S. in 30 diﬀerent ﬁelds (Table 1), STEM
ﬁelds are characterized by female representation ranging from
just under 20% (physics) to over 50% (molecular biology;
National Science Foundation [NSF], 2011). An even larger range
is observed within SocSci/Hum ﬁelds, with women earning fewer
than 35% of doctoral degrees in philosophy and economics, yet
over 75% in art history. Indeed, the range of variation is so wide
that many STEMﬁelds feature higher female representation at the
Ph.D. level than many SocSci/Hum ﬁelds. Given this large varia-
tion within STEM and SocSci/Hum considered separately, it is
apparent that expanding the focus of inquiry to include gender
gaps in both STEM and SocSci/Hum might provide new insights
into the problem of female underrepresentation. In the current
study, we adopt such a broad focus, examining whether the FAB
hypothesis can account for the ﬁeld-by-ﬁeld variability observed
across the entire academic spectrum.
Initial Evidence for the FAB Hypothesis
In a recent study, we sought to test whether the FABs held by aca-
demics could predict the wide ﬁeld-by-ﬁeld variability observed
in female representation across both STEM and non-STEM ﬁelds
(Leslie and Cimpian et al., 2015). We gathered responses from
a sample of over 1800 professors, graduate students, and post-
doctoral researchers from research-intensive universities across
the U.S. in 30 diﬀerent ﬁelds (12 STEM, 18 SocSci/Hum;Table 1).
We ﬁrst asked participants to report on their beliefs regard-
ing what was required for success in their own ﬁeld, focusing
on assessing beliefs about the relative importance of intrinsic,
stable ability vs. eﬀort and practice (see Dweck, 2000, 2006).
We then used these items to provide a metric of ﬁeld-level
ability beliefs; each ﬁeld received a FAB score expressing aver-
age endorsement of ability vs. eﬀort across individuals within a
given ﬁeld (with higher scores indicating more emphasis on raw
ability). Results included three important ﬁndings. First, FABs
FIGURE 1 | Diagram of the field-specific ability beliefs (FAB) hypothesis.
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TABLE 1 | Percent of American Ph.D.’s earned by women in 2011* in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) and Social
science/Humanities fields.
STEM Field % of Ph.D.’s who are Female Social science/Humanities field % of Ph.D.’s who are Female
Physics 18.0 Music theory and composition 15.8
Computer science 18.6 Philosophy 31.4
Engineering 22.2 Economics 34.4
Mathematics 28.6 Middle Eastern studies 38.1
Astronomy 29.2 Classics 41.8
Earth sciences 36.2 Political science 43.1
Chemistry 37.8 History 45.0
Statistics 41.6 Archeology 52.3
Biochemistry 45.4 Linguistics 59.2
Neuroscience 49.4 Anthropology 59.6
Evolutionary biology 49.8 Spanish/Spanish literature 59.9
Molecular biology 54.4 Comparative literature 60.9
Sociology 61.3
English literature 62.4
Communication studies 64.2
Education 69.3
Psychology 72.1
Art history 76.8
*Data from 2011 NSF Survey of Earned Doctorates.
were strongly negatively associated with female representation
(as measured by proportion of U.S. Ph.D. degrees earned by
women; National Science Foundation [NSF], 2011), providing
initial broad support for the hypothesis: there were fewer women
in ﬁelds believed to require stable, raw talent. Second, ability
beliefs were predictive of female representation over and above
whether a ﬁeld was STEM or SocSci/Hum, suggesting that the
FAB hypothesis can account well for the wide variability observed
even within the two categories of ﬁelds. Finally, the FAB hypoth-
esis outperformed a number of other constructs often theorized
to contribute to gender gaps in academia, including ﬁeld-speciﬁc
variation in work-life balance (e.g., Ferriman et al., 2009), selec-
tivity (e.g., Hedges and Nowell, 1995), and reliance on skills
related to systemizing vs. empathizing (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 2002).
The Present Research
Do Laypeople’s Beliefs Predict Female
Representation?
Results from Leslie and Cimpian et al. (2015) suggest that women
are underrepresented in ﬁelds whose practitioners consistently
endorse the idea that success rests on brilliance. The current study
extends existing work on the FAB hypothesis by exploring what
non-academics believe is required for success in a variety of ﬁelds.
We hypothesize that the FABs endorsed by academics will be
shared, at least to some extent, by people outside of academia
as well. This is an important extension of the FAB framework
because, to the extent that these beliefs are shared by the gen-
eral public, they could inﬂuence women’s career choices in a
much broader variety of contexts than the beliefs of academics
per se. If these beliefs pervade our society, then—in combination
with the stereotypes against women’s intellectual abilities—they
could lead a variety of individuals (parents, teachers, peers, etc.)
to see women as somewhat unsuited for “brilliance-required”
domains. Even in the absence of such biased treatment, widely
shared ability beliefs similar to those previously identiﬁed in aca-
demics could lead young women to doubt that they could succeed
in brilliance-focused disciplines and thus to decide against pursu-
ing careers in them. Our main prediction is thus that laypeople’s
beliefs, like those of academics, will predict female representation:
the more a ﬁeld is believed to require intellectual brilliance, the
fewer the women.
We can also formulate a more detailed hypothesis here:
people with more exposure to the ﬁelds in question (e.g., via
college classes) will have FABs that predict female representa-
tion more precisely than the beliefs of people with less expo-
sure. We expect this to be the case because the FABs of those
with more exposure to a discipline will likely be more sim-
ilar to those of the practitioners of that discipline, and are
thus more likely to be similar to the kinds of beliefs that stu-
dents will encounter and absorb as they start to consider higher
education and careers in these ﬁelds (Leslie and Cimpian et al.,
2015). In Study 1, we tested the prediction that college-exposed
individuals’ ability beliefs would better predict gender gaps
in representation by ﬁrst dividing our participants into those
who had college exposure to a ﬁeld and those who did not,
and then exploring whether the beliefs of the college-exposed
group predict female representation at a more ﬁne-grained
level.
A ﬁnal aim of Study 1 was to address an alternative explana-
tion for the hypothesized relationship between ability beliefs and
female representation. As we have argued, underlying the main
predictions described above is our claim that FABs inﬂuence
women’s academic and career choices. However, might laypeo-
ple’s beliefs be simply inferred from their pre-existing knowl-
edge about the proportion of women in the diﬀerent ﬁelds?
For instance, our participants—particularly those who have had
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college experience in the relevant ﬁelds and thus have had the
opportunity to witness gender disparities ﬁrsthand—might rely
on stereotypes against women’s intellectual abilities to arrive at
the conclusion that ﬁelds with few women must require high
levels of such abilities, whereas ﬁelds with many women must
not. To address this possibility, we asked participants to esti-
mate the proportion of women in the ﬁelds under investigation,
and assessed whether participants’ ability beliefs still predicted
female representation independent from these estimates. If so,
this would undermine the possibility that participants simply
infer their ability beliefs from their estimates of the ﬁeld’s diver-
sity.
Assessing Beliefs Beyond FAB
There are surely many other dimensions that vary among ﬁelds
and inﬂuence the gender breakdown of the people who partic-
ipate in them, and we do not claim that FAB is the only factor
in determining academic gender gaps. Indeed, as we observed at
the outset, other such factors have been evaluated extensively in
prior studies (for reviews, see Ceci and Williams, 2007; Ceci et al.,
2009, 2014; Hill et al., 2010). Although an exhaustive evaluation
of these additional factors is outside the scope of the current
studies, we take up this issue within the framework of evaluating
other beliefs about what is required for success in the ﬁelds under
investigation. In particular, Study 2 examines two questions. First,
do ﬁeld-speciﬁc beliefs about the importance of intellectual bril-
liance reduce to beliefs about speciﬁc types of skills required for
success? Speciﬁcally, do they reduce to beliefs about the degree to
which mathematical and verbal skills are required for individual
ﬁelds? Second, is the relationship between FABs and female repre-
sentation mediated by beliefs about what kinds of work (solitary
vs. collaborative; competitive vs. cooperative) are required?
Our ﬁrst question addresses a potential alternative explana-
tion for the predictive power of FABs. A critic might note that
the extent to which mathematics is involved in a ﬁeld appears
to be particularly predictive of whether women are underrepre-
sented or not: ﬁelds that are math-intensive attract and retain
fewer women, with math-intensive STEM ﬁelds (e.g., engineer-
ing, math, or physics) characterized by the most extreme gender
disparities (in comparison to STEM ﬁelds that are less math-
intensive, like the life sciences, which often feature parity or even
a predominance of women; National Science Foundation [NSF],
2011). The smaller number of women in math-intensive ﬁelds
may be due in part to the cultural belief that math is “for” males,
a belief that appears to emerge as early as elementary school
and may contribute to women’s reduced interest in careers that
require it (Fredericks and Eccles, 2002; Herbert and Stipek, 2005;
Cvencek et al., 2011). In light of this evidence, one might ask: is
it possible that the “intellectual brilliance” at the heart of the FAB
hypothesis is just another way of referring to mathematical apti-
tude, which is also popularly conceived as a ﬁxed, innate quantity?
That is, might it be the case that people’s FABs simply reduce to
their beliefs about how much individual ﬁelds require math over
other kinds of skills (e.g., verbal skills)?
Results from Study 1 could bear on this question. If, as
hypothesized we ﬁnd that FABs are capable of predicting female
representation across a variety of ﬁelds, including those unlikely
to be thought of as drawing on mathematical skills (such as
most social sciences and humanities disciplines), it is unlikely
that these beliefs aremerely capturing people’s beliefs about ﬁeld-
speciﬁc mathematical requirements. However, it is important to
more directly establish whether FABs are distinct from beliefs
about the importance of mathematics. To do so, in Study 2 we
tested whether beliefs about raw ability and brilliance predict
unique variance in gender gaps, beyond that predicted by people’s
beliefs about how much individual ﬁelds rely on mathematical
and verbal ability.
Finally, it is worth noting that, as in Study 1, college expo-
sure may matter. Participants with college experience likely have
more nuanced, diﬀerentiated beliefs both about which ﬁelds
require mathematical skills and about which ﬁelds require intrin-
sic ability. We thus hypothesized that when looking speciﬁ-
cally at individuals with college exposure, FABs would inde-
pendently predict female representation over and above beliefs
about math and verbal skills, supporting the idea that FAB can
account for female representation across the academic spec-
trum.
Next, we turn to the issue of potential beliefs that may medi-
ate the relationship between FABs and female representation.
In particular, we explore the possibility that people’s beliefs
about the importance of brilliance vs. eﬀort for success in a
ﬁeld give rise to diﬀerentiated perceptions of the kind of atmo-
sphere that ﬁeld promotes. We focused our exploration on two
important aspects of a ﬁeld’s atmosphere that (1) could be plau-
sibly inferred based on the ﬁeld’s presumed emphasis on bril-
liance, and that (2) men and women have diverging attitudes
toward: namely, the extent to which the ﬁeld requires com-
petition (vs. collaboration) and solitary work (vs. group work;
e.g., Lippa, 1998; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Diekman et al.,
2010; Gupta et al., 2013; Lippa et al., 2014). There are several rea-
sons why “brilliance-required” ﬁelds might also be presumed to
require competition and solitary work. If a ﬁeld values intel-
lectual prowess, it is reasonable to expect that it would also
encourage displays of that sort of ability, which might in turn
encourage competition between individual practitioners. After
all, it is only by comparing one’s ability against others (by partic-
ipating in contests, engaging in aggressive debates, being harshly
critical of others’ perceived mistakes, etc.) that one can reveal
how brightly one’s intellectual ability shines. Working with oth-
ers in cooperative contexts, on the other hand, would make it
hard to assess whose talent was responsible for any ultimate suc-
cess attained, so this type of collaborative work may be assumed
to be rare within ﬁelds that prize brilliance. The inference that
brilliance-requiring ﬁelds involve solitary, and often competi-
tive, work is also likely to be supported by pervasive cultural
tropes that portray brilliance and genius as qualities that a per-
son possesses and displays in isolation rather than as part of a
team of collaborators (e.g., Shenk, 2014). In turn, these infer-
ences about the nature of the work environment in a ﬁeld may
inﬂuence whether young men and women consider careers in
it because males and females are socialized to place diﬀerent
value on communal vs. agentic goals and on collaborative vs.
competitive interactions. In other words, the downstream infer-
ences licensed by FABs may be part of the reason why these
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beliefs are predictive of gender gaps1. We tested this hypothesis
in Study 2.
Summary of Predictions
Study 1 examined two main predictions, one broad and one
more speciﬁc. Broadly speaking, we expected that there would
be a relationship between laypeople’s FABs and female repre-
sentation, such that ﬁelds believed to require brilliance would
have fewer women. At a greater level of speciﬁcity, we expected
that college exposure would diﬀerentiate the predictive power of
FABs, such that the beliefs of those exposed to the ﬁelds dur-
ing college would be particularly predictive. Finally, Study 1 also
examined whether ability beliefs independently predicted female
representation above and beyond people’s estimates of female rep-
resentation (suggesting that any observed relationship between
ability beliefs and actual female representation did not emerge
simply because individuals constructed FABs from their beliefs
about female representation).
Study 2 was designed to replicate the main ﬁndings of Study 1,
and to extend the inquiry into additional beliefs that might
relate to gender disparities. We made two predictions. First, we
predicted that FABs would not reduce to people’s beliefs about
mathematical skill, particularly when examining beliefs from
individuals with college exposure in the ﬁeld. Second, ﬁelds that
are believed to require raw ability should also be perceived as
requiring solo work and competition; in turn, these perceptions
should predict gender gaps, with fewer women obtaining Ph.D.’s
in ﬁelds assumed to demand high levels of solo work and com-
petition. In other words, we expected that beliefs about solo work
and competition would mediate (at least partially) the observed
association between FAB and gender breakdowns.
Study 1
Method
Participants
Participants included 307 individuals recruited via Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an online crowd-sourcing
platform2,3. Only participants reporting themselves as liv-
ing in the U.S. and with prior MTurk approval rates of 90%
1We acknowledge that beliefs about solo/competitive work mediating FAB’s rela-
tionship with women’s representation represents only one possible causal pathway;
it is also possible that people could perceive the solo/competitive nature of a ﬁeld
and then conclude that it requires raw ability. More generally, we also note that
there are likely many more factors involved in the pathways that ultimately result
in the observed ﬁeld-by-ﬁeld variation in women’s representation. More compre-
hensive exploration of these factors, as well as experimental work, will be needed
to deﬁnitively establish how FABs inﬂuence the observed gender gaps.
2All human subjects research reported in this paper was approved by the
Institutional Review Board of the ﬁrst author’s home institution.
3Mechanical Turk oﬀers a convenience sample rather than a fully nationally rep-
resentative sample. Analyses of American MTurk workers have demonstrated that
women are overrepresented, that workers are typically younger and more educated
than average, and that Blacks and Hispanics are underrepresented (Berinsky et al.,
2012; Paolacci and Chandler, 2014). Thus, we do not claim to be capturing beliefs
that are fully representative of the U.S. public. Nevertheless, the diversity of an
MTurk sample is arguably higher than that of most samples used in human sub-
jects research (i.e., college samples), and it provides a good source of data for an
examination of beliefs held by individuals outside of academia.
or above were included. Participants were compensated $0.75
for survey completion. Data were excluded from an additional
48 individuals who (1) failed to complete the survey, (2)
answered an attention-check question incorrectly, (3) had IP
addresses indicating they were outside the U.S., and/or (4) had
IP addresses indicating they had completed similar studies in the
past.
Materials and Procedure
To avoid participant fatigue, we created three versions of the
survey, each of which contained 10 of the 30 ﬁelds under inves-
tigation. (Fields were identical to those examined in our original
study of academics (Leslie and Cimpian et al., 2015)). Fields were
chosen to represent a broad spectrum of social sciences, human-
ities, and STEM disciplines. Approximately equal numbers of
subjects participated in the three versions, and assignment was
random (Version 1, n = 103; Version 2, n = 101; Version 3,
n = 103). Each version included three humanities subjects, three
social science subjects, and four STEM subjects. Each survey con-
tained four questions assessing FABs about each of the 10 ﬁelds
(from Leslie and Cimpian et al., 2015; Table 2). Questions were
presented individually in random order with all 10 ﬁelds listed
beneath each question. Participants indicated their agreement
with the statement as it applied to each ﬁeld using a 7-point Likert
scale (1= strongly disagree to 7= strongly agree, with eight as an
option to indicate “don’t know”). Two attention-check questions
were also included to ensure that participants were attending to
the task.
Next, a series of questions asked about participants’ academic
exposure to the 10 ﬁelds, including whether they had had (1) a
high school class, (2) a college class, and/or (3) a graduate-level
class in each of them. Participants were also asked to estimate
how many women had received American doctoral degrees in
each ﬁeld in the recent past, with 10 response options corre-
sponding to 10% intervals ranging from 0 to 100%. A ﬁnal set
of questions asked about demographic information (gender, age,
ethnicity, and race).
For each ﬁeld, we calculated FAB scores by averaging scores
across participants from the four ability belief questions. Higher
scores indicated more emphasis on brilliance. Three separate
FAB scores were calculated: (1) All Participants’ FAB (using
data from all participants except those with graduate level
experience in the ﬁeld)4, (2) College Exposure FAB (using
data from participants who had taken college, but not grad-
uate level, courses in the ﬁeld) and (3) No College Exposure
FAB (using data from participants who had taken neither
college nor graduate courses in the ﬁeld). The four items
had high internal reliability (for all participants, α = 0.90;
for College Exposure, α = 0.93; for No College Exposure,
α = 0.89).
4We excluded data regarding individual ﬁelds if they were provided by people
reporting graduate-level experience in that ﬁeld. We did so because we wanted
to exclude beliefs held by people with extensive familiarity with the ﬁeld gained
through graduate-level exposure, allowing the focus of the current study to be
restricted only to individuals with no college experience vs. college experience with
the ﬁeld.
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TABLE 2 | Survey items for Study 1 and Study 2.
Field-specific ability beliefs
Being a top scholar of [field] requires a special aptitude that just can’t be taught.
If you want to succeed in [field], hard work alone just won’t cut it; you need to have an innate gift or talent.
With the right amount of effort and dedication, anyone can become a top scholar in [field]. (R)
When it comes to [field], the most important factors for success are motivation and sustained effort; raw ability is secondary. (R)
To succeed in [field] you have to be a special kind of person; not just anyone can be successful in it. (in Study 2 only.)
People who are successful in [field] are very different from ordinary people. (in Study 2 only.)
Estimate of female representation (Study 1)
Please provide your best guess or estimate to this question: in the recent past, what percentage of doctoral (Ph.D.) degrees from American universities do
you think have been earned by women in [field]?
Verbal and mathematical ability (Study 2)
Top-level success in [field] depends to a large extent on one’s verbal ability.
Top-level success in [field] depends to a large extent on one’s mathematical ability.
Solo and competitive work (Study 2)
[Field] is a field in which you spend a lot of time working by yourself rather than being around other people.
[Field] is a field in which competition with others is much more common than collaboration.
(R) indicates items that were reverse scored.
Responses to all items except estimate of female representation were given on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree), with an additional option for
“don’t know.” Responses for estimate of female representation were given on a 10-point scale, with each point representing a 10% increment.
Results and Discussion
Study 1 tested two main predictions. First, we expected that par-
ticipants’ FABs would be correlated with female representation
regardless of participants’ level of direct prior exposure with the
ﬁelds (via courses). Second, we predicted that beliefs held by indi-
viduals with college experience would nevertheless be predictive
of female representation at a ﬁner-grained level than those of peo-
ple with no college experience. In particular, we expected that
the College Exposure, but not the No College Exposure, FAB
scores would predict female representation even after taking into
account a gross STEM vs. non-STEM distinction between ﬁelds,
which would speak to the ability of the College Exposure FAB
scores to predict the complex ﬁeld-by-ﬁeld variability in female
representation observed within these broad domains. Finally, we
examined whether beliefs of college-exposed and non-college-
exposed individuals predicted actual female representation inde-
pendent of participants’ estimates of female representation. If
so, this would rule out the possibility that ability beliefs pre-
dicted female representation for the trivial reason that they were
inferred from participants’ pre-existing knowledge about gender
disparities.
To assess our ﬁrst prediction, we examined the correlation
between FABs and female representation. Any ﬁelds for which
we received fewer than 10 participants in either the no-college-
experience or college-experience samples were removed from the
analysis; estimates based on so few participants would likely be
unreliable. This resulted in 29 ﬁelds being retained for analysis.
(The single removed ﬁeld was neuroscience; only seven individu-
als reported college experience with this ﬁeld.) As predicted, ﬁelds
believed to require brilliance had lower female representation,
r(27) = −0.59, p = 0.001 (Figure 2).
To address the second prediction, we separately examined
beliefs held by people with college exposure and those held by
people without college exposure. Beliefs of both groups were
signiﬁcantly negatively associated with female representation:
College Exposure scores, r(27) = −0.67, p < 0.001, and No
College Exposure scores, r(27) = −0.51, p = 0.005. Steiger’s
z score comparison (Lee and Preacher, 2013) indicated that
College Exposure scores were more strongly associated with
female representation than No College Exposure scores, z = 2.09,
p = 0.037, providing initial support for the prediction that
college-exposed individuals’ beliefs would relate more strongly
with representation. We then investigated whether the abil-
ity beliefs of these two groups predicted female representation
above and beyond whether a ﬁeld was STEM vs. a social sci-
ence/humanities discipline (i.e., non-STEM). Two separate mul-
tiple regression analyses were performed with female representa-
tion as the dependent variable and two predictors: a STEM/non-
STEM indicator variable and either (1) College Exposure FAB
scores or (2) No College Exposure FAB scores. These analy-
ses indicated that, as hypothesized, the FABs held by partic-
ipants with college exposure to the ﬁelds were uniquely pre-
dictive of female representation, above and beyond whether
the ﬁelds were in STEM or SocSci/Hum (β = −0.44, boot-
strapped p = 0.013), whereas the beliefs of participants with-
out college exposure were not (β = −0.15, bootstrapped
p = 0.449).
Finally, we added college-exposed and non-college-exposed
participants’ estimates of female representation as predictors to
the two regressions above. Consistent with our argument, the
FABs of college-exposed participants remained a signiﬁcant pre-
dictor of actual female representation even when adjusting for
these participants’ estimates of female representation (β= −0.41,
bootstrapped p = 0.043; see Table 3). In contrast, the beliefs
of participants without college exposure were not a signiﬁcant
predictor of female representation in this model (β = −0.30,
bootstrapped p = 0.257; see Table 3). Thus, it is not the case that
college-exposed participants’ ability beliefs are predictive of gen-
der gaps across academia simply because they are derived from
prior knowledge of such gaps.
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FIGURE 2 | The relationship between FABs (all participants) and female representation (Study 1).
TABLE 3 | Regressions predicting female representation using
field-specific ability beliefs and estimates of female representation of
participants with college experience (CE; Upper) and with no college
experience (NCE; Lower), Study 1.
Predictor R2 F p
β p 0.686 15.87 <0.001
STEM indicator 0.07 0.686
Estimate of female
representation (CE)
0.58 0.001
Field-specific ability
beliefs (CE)
−0.41 0.043
β p 0.55 10.37 <0.001
STEM indicator −0.22 0.340
Estimate of female
representation (NCE)
0.44 0.023
Field-specific ability
beliefs (NCE)
−0.30 0.257
n = 29, df (4,24).
We considered one ﬁnal alternative interpretation, which
applies particularly to the ﬁndings obtained with college-exposed
individuals. Perhaps College Exposure FAB scores emphasize
brilliance for ﬁelds where there are few women just because
(1) men may be more likely than women to believe that bril-
liance is required for success, and (2) more men in the cur-
rent sample may have taken college classes in disciplines where
women are typically underrepresented. In other words, disci-
plines with lower female representation may have higher College
Exposure FAB scores for the simple reason that male partic-
ipants’ brilliance-focused ability beliefs are overrepresented in
our sample for these disciplines. Consistent with this possibil-
ity, college-exposed men’s scores (M = 3.56, SD = 0.55) were
indeed higher than college-exposed women’s scores (M = 3.18,
SD = 0.64), t(28) = 4.02, p < 0.001, suggesting that men placed
more emphasis on raw ability. In addition, our sample con-
tained proportionately more college-exposed men in ﬁelds with
lower female representation at the Ph.D. level, r(27) = −0.66,
p < 0.001. To test whether these diﬀerences could explain our
main result, we calculated a gender-balanced FAB score for each
ﬁeld by computing the average scores for men and women sepa-
rately within ﬁelds, and then averaging these two gender-speciﬁc
scores. This measure adjusts for the diﬀerential representation
of college-exposed males and females across ﬁelds, giving the
two groups an equal say in determining the FAB score for each
ﬁeld. If the current alternative explanation were correct, this
gender-balanced score should no longer be predictive of female
representation. However, when we entered the gender-balanced
FAB score in place of the original FAB score in the regression
including both STEM status and estimated female representation,
it still predicted female representation (β = −0.35, bootstrapped
p = 0.069). Thus, the main results described above were not
merely a byproduct of men’s brilliance-oriented beliefs inﬂating
the College Exposure FAB scores of ﬁelds with fewer women.
In sum, the results of Study 1 lend clear support to the pre-
dictions we derived from the FAB model: women are less likely
to be represented in ﬁelds believed to require stable, innate abil-
ity. Furthermore, as predicted, the ﬁeld-speciﬁc beliefs of people
with college experience in our ﬁelds were predictive of female
representation at a more detailed level than were the beliefs of
those without college experience. To speculate, perhaps initially
people hold a global belief that disciplines in the STEM fam-
ily require innate skill; as a result, the predictive power of these
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initial, inchoate ability beliefs is mostly captured by the STEM
vs. non-STEM distinction. It is only after exposure to the par-
ticularities of the ﬁelds and the beliefs of their practitioners that
FABs take on independent predictive power in relation to female
representation.
Study 2 provides an opportunity to replicate the above ﬁnd-
ings, and to further explore how gender breakdowns are related
to ﬁeld-diﬀerentiated beliefs about the types of skills and work
that are required. Two predictions are central to Study 2. First,
we expect that the FABs of participants with college experience
will predict unique variance in female representation, above and
beyond their beliefs about the role of mathematical or verbal
skills. Second, we predict that participants’ assumptions about
how much solitary and competitive work is required by individ-
ual ﬁelds will mediate the relationship between FABs and female
representation.
Study 2
Method
Participants
Participants included 302 individuals recruited via Amazon’s
MTurk, using the same inclusion criteria as in Study 1.
Participants were compensated $0.95 for survey completion. Data
were excluded from an additional 53 individuals who met one
or more of the exclusion criteria used in Study 1: (1) failing to
complete the survey, (2) answering an attention check question
incorrectly, (3) having an IP address suggesting residence outside
the U.S., and/or (4) having IP addresses indicating completion of
similar studies (including our Study 1) in the past.
Materials and Procedure
As in Study 1, three versions of the survey were created, each of
which contained the same subsets of 10 of the 30 ﬁelds under
investigation. Approximately equal numbers of subjects partici-
pated in the three versions, and assignment was random (Version
1, n = 101; Version 2, n = 103; Version 3, n = 98). Surveys
included the same four FAB items as in Study 1, along with two
additional, broader questions on this topic (Table 2). These ques-
tions were added to further assess FABs, with the goal of using
more accessible language while still providing a sensitive index
of participants’ beliefs about innate ability vs. eﬀort. Two items
were also included to address people’s beliefs about the extent
to which verbal and mathematical skills are required, and two
ﬁnal items were included to assess beliefs about whether com-
petition and solitary work are important for success in a ﬁeld
(Table 2).
As in Study 1, items were presented individually in random
order with all 10 ﬁelds listed beneath each item. Participants again
indicated their agreement with the statement as it applied to each
of the 10 ﬁelds using a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree
to 7 = strongly agree, with eight as an option to indicate “don’t
know”). Two attention-check questions were also included. The
survey then ended with questions assessing high school, col-
lege, and graduate level exposure to each of the 10 ﬁelds, along
with several demographic questions. (These questions were all
identical to those in Study 1).
We calculated FAB scores by averaging scores across the
six items, and then averaging within ﬁelds to create ﬁeld-level
scores. Three separate FAB scores were calculated reﬂecting (1)
All Participants’ FAB (using data from all participants except
those with graduate level experience in the ﬁeld), (2) College
Exposure FAB (using data from participants who had taken col-
lege, but not graduate level, courses in the ﬁeld), and (3) No
College Exposure FAB (using data from participants who had
taken neither college nor graduate courses in the ﬁeld). Scores
for the six ability beliefs questions had high internal reliability
(for all participants, α = 0.89; for College Exposure, α = 0.93;
for No College Exposure, α = 0.87). Deletion of the last two
items added for Study 2 did not improve scale reliability, indi-
cating it was appropriate to include them as part of the FAB
scale.
Results and Discussion
To explore whether Study 2 replicated the key ﬁnding that FABs
predict female representation, we again examined correlations
between FAB and percentage of female Ph.D. recipients. As
before, ﬁelds with fewer than 10 participants reporting either
college or no college exposure were removed. This resulted in
27 ﬁelds being retained for analysis. (Middle Eastern studies,
neuroscience, and archeology were removed because they had
College Exposure ns of 8, 4, and 3, respectively.) Replicating
ﬁndings from Study 1, FAB scores were negatively associated
with female representation when examining belief scores of all
participants, r(25) = −0.63, p < 0.001, as well as when exam-
ining College Exposure scores, r(25) = −0.65, p < 0.001, and
No College Exposure scores, r(25) = −0.54, p = 0.004. Although
College Exposure scores were more strongly associated with
female representation than No College Exposure scores, this
diﬀerence was not signiﬁcant according to Steiger’s z score com-
parison (Lee and Preacher, 2013), z = 1.13, p = 0.258. However,
again replicating Study 1, we found that the FABs of partici-
pants with college experience predicted female representation
even when a STEM indicator variable was added to the regres-
sion model as a competitor (β = −0.37; bootstrapped p= 0.048);
in contrast, the beliefs of those without college experience were
not uniquely predictive when the STEM indicator was added
(β= −0.15; bootstrapped p= 0.48). Thus, beliefs held by college-
exposed individuals again predicted female representation better
than those of non-college-exposed individuals.
We next examined the relationship between female represen-
tation and the extent to which a ﬁeld is perceived as demanding
verbal and mathematical skills. Beliefs about the need for ver-
bal skills were positively associated with female representation:
beliefs of all participants, r(25) = 0.63, p < 0.001; of partici-
pants with college exposure, r(25) = 0.63, p = 0.001; of par-
ticipants with no college exposure, r(25) = 0.65, p < 0.001.
Beliefs about the need for mathematical skills were negatively
associated with female representation: beliefs of all participants,
r(25) = −0.64, p < 0.001; of participants with college expo-
sure, r(25) = −0.60, p = 0.001; of participants with no college
exposure r(25) = −0.64, p< 0.001.
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We then tested our prediction that FABs of individu-
als with college exposure would predict female representation
independently from beliefs about the role of mathematical and
verbal skills. If so, this would strengthen the claim that FABs
tap into something distinct from people’s beliefs about which
ﬁelds require mathematical aptitude. To assess this prediction,
we added perceptions of the need for verbal and mathematical
skill as variables in the two regressions predicting female repre-
sentation. For the regression testing beliefs of those with college
experience (Table 4), FABs were uniquely predictive of women’s
representation, above and beyond STEM status and beliefs about
the importance of mathematical and verbal skill, β= −0.39, boot-
strapped p = 0.085, although this coeﬃcient was only signiﬁcant
at the α = 0.10 level. In contrast, beliefs about the importance
of verbal and mathematical ability did not independently pre-
dict female representation in this model, ps > 0.489. For the
regression testing the beliefs of those without college experience,
no factor was signiﬁcantly predictive of female representation,
ps > 0.454 (Table 4).
As in Study 1, we also calculated a gender-balanced FAB score
to examine the possibility that diﬀerences inmale and female par-
ticipants’ ability beliefs and college experience were driving the
eﬀects observed for college-exposed participants. (To reiterate,
the possibility being tested here is that College Exposure FAB
scores in ﬁelds with fewer women are inﬂated simply because
men may have ability beliefs that are more brilliance-oriented
and may also be overrepresented in the college-exposure sam-
ple for these ﬁelds.) Again, the proportion of college-exposed
male participants within each ﬁeld was negatively related to
female representation at the Ph.D. level, r(25) = −0.41, p = 0.03,
indicating that college-exposed male participants were more
numerous in ﬁelds with lower female representation. In this
sample, however, college-exposed men’s FAB scores (M = 3.70,
SD = 0.71) were actually lower than college-exposed women’s
TABLE 4 | Regressions predicting female representation using
field-specific ability beliefs and beliefs about the importance of verbal and
mathematical skill of participants with college experience (CE; Upper) and
with no college experience (NCE; Lower), Study 2.
Predictor R2 F p
β p 0.52 6.05 0.002
STEM indicator −0.11 0.747
Field-specific ability
beliefs (CE)
−0.39 0.085
Verbal skill beliefs (CE) 0.26 0.489
Mathematical skill beliefs
(CE)
−0.06 0.820
β p 0.49 5.29 0.004
STEM indicator −0.21 0.524
Field-specific ability
Beliefs (NCE)
−0.14 0.516
Verbal skill beliefs (NCE) 0.17 0.614
Mathematical skill beliefs
(NCE)
−0.26 0.454
n = 27, df (4,22).
scores (M = 3.85, SD = 0.60), though not signiﬁcantly so,
t(26) = 1.69, p = 0.103. Thus, this alternative explanation is
unlikely: college-exposed male participants, though more numer-
ous in ﬁelds with fewer women at the Ph.D. level, did not diﬀer
from college-exposed female participants in their ability beliefs.
Nevertheless, we entered a gender-balanced FAB score in place of
the original FAB score in the regression model that also included
a STEM indicator, beliefs about mathematical ability, and beliefs
about verbal ability. As before, ability beliefs were the sole predic-
tor of female representation (β= −0.44, bootstrapped p= 0.059).
These results strengthen the main claim that ability beliefs are
predictive of female representation, above and beyond beliefs
about mathematical and verbal skills.
Finally, we tested the prediction that beliefs about solo work
and competitiveness would mediate the relationship between
FABs and female representation. Consistent with our argu-
ment, a bootstrapped (1,000 replications) product-of-coeﬃcients
mediation analysis performed with the PROCESS procedure in
SPSS 22 (Hayes, 2013) revealed that the relationship between
college-exposed participants’ ability beliefs about a discipline and
the proportion of female Ph.D.’s in that discipline was signiﬁ-
cantly mediated by these participants’ ideas about the amount
of solo work and the level of competitiveness required by the
discipline, ab = −13.56 (−26.74, −2.91). Similar results were
obtained when examining beliefs of non-college-exposed partic-
ipants, ab = −13.61 (−24.65, −5.94)5. (For full results of the
mediation models, see Figures 3 and 4.) Results are thus con-
sistent with the idea that FABs may inﬂuence women’s partici-
pation in a ﬁeld in part by inﬂuencing their beliefs about what
it is like to be a member of that ﬁeld—in particular, whether
one works by oneself or with others, and whether success rests
more on competition with colleagues rather than cooperation.
Interestingly, this result was observed even within the group
who had not had college exposure to the ﬁeld, which may be
because inferences about the nature of the work demanded by
various ﬁelds are easily drawn from one’s ability beliefs about
these ﬁelds, no matter how much ﬁrst-hand experience one has
with them.
General Discussion
Women are underrepresented in many STEM ﬁelds, but the pat-
tern of gender distribution is complex, and a substantial amount
of variation also exists in non-STEM ﬁelds. An important aim
of the current studies was to provide an account for the wide
variability in female representation across the entire academic
spectrum. Wemaintain that the FAB hypothesis provides such an
account. This hypothesis predicts that women will be underrep-
resented in ﬁelds believed to emphasize brilliance and inherent
ability as the key to success; this is because women are often
stereotyped as lacking the same sort of innate intelligence as men,
and thus women will be discouraged from participating in ﬁelds
to the extent that these ﬁelds are perceived as requiring this type
5The indirect paths were again signiﬁcant even when adjusting for beliefs about
mathematical skills, both for college-exposed participants, ab = −9.21 (−22.11,
−1.73) and for non-college-exposed participants, ab = −9.54 (−19.77, −2.89).
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FIGURE 3 | The indirect pathways linking college-exposed participants’ FABs with women’s representation via participants’ beliefs about the amount
of solo work (top) and the level of competitiveness (bottom) required by a field (Study 2). ∼p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.
FIGURE 4 | The indirect pathways linking non-college-exposed participants’ FABs with women’s representation via participants’ beliefs about the
amount of solo work (top) and the level of competitiveness (bottom) required by a field (Study 2). *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.
of intelligence. Prior research has provided support for the FAB
hypothesis within higher academia (Leslie and Cimpian et al.,
2015). The current studies extended the focus to an examina-
tion of beliefs held by individuals outside academia. The results
of our two studies are consistent with the FABs hypothesis: fewer
women are involved in ﬁelds that laypeople believe to require raw
intellectual ability.
Several additional ﬁndings from the present studies are worth
highlighting. The ability beliefs of individuals who had college-
level exposure to the ﬁelds in question predicted female rep-
resentation even when controlling for whether a ﬁeld was in
STEM or not, indicating that college may provide a unique con-
text for reﬁnement and elaboration of beliefs about what ﬁelds
require for success. Results also suggested that the ability beliefs
of participants with college experience are not simply a byprod-
uct of participants’ inferring these beliefs based on their prior
knowledge of female representation (Study 1). Further, college-
exposed participants’ ability beliefs capture something beyond
perceptions of speciﬁc types of skills required for success, as
FABs of college-exposed individuals did not reduce to beliefs
about which ﬁelds require mathematical and/or verbal skills
(Study 2).
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Notably, these ﬁndings have important consequences for
potential interventions to improve diversity, both in terms of
timing and in terms of content. College may be a pivotal experi-
ence during which people’s FABs become entrenched, and start to
conform to those of their instructors. This highlights the crucial
role that college educators play in communicating these mal-
adaptive beliefs—but also suggests that they may be able to play
an active role in changing the relevant messages. In particular,
our data suggest that instructors who want to promote diver-
sity might aim to minimize discussion of innate talent, regardless
of the domain of skills with which it is associated, and instead
highlight the importance of eﬀort, practice, and persistence to
success in a ﬁeld. Prior work on individuals’ achievement beliefs
suggests that such growth-oriented messages can be relayed in
a range of ways: by choice of adjectives (in particular by avoid-
ing words like “brilliant,” “genius,” etc.; , Mueller and Dweck,
1998; Cimpian et al., 2007; Heyman, 2008), by focusing on what
the person has achieved rather than on the person’s inherent
traits (Kamins and Dweck, 1999), and by explicitly stating that
dedication and eﬀort are paramount (Mueller and Dweck, 1998;
Kamins and Dweck, 1999; Blackwell et al., 2007). We expect that
practices such as these would be easily implementable by col-
lege educators across many ﬁelds. It should be borne in mind
that the messages that college educators send may not only
aﬀect the participation of the women in their classes, but also
have more far-reaching impact. As their students—both men and
women—may go on to become parents, caregivers, school teach-
ers, etc., they may subtly communicate their own ability beliefs to
future generations (e.g., through their own choice of adjectives;
Cimpian et al., 2007). This in turn may inﬂuence even very young
girls’ engagement and educational choices (Cimpian et al., 2014;
Leslie et al., 2015).
The current studies also suggest that beliefs about solo and
competitive work may mediate the relationship between ability
beliefs and female representation. It is possible that this result
reﬂects a process by which ability beliefs inﬂuence perceptions
of what it is like to work in certain ﬁelds, which in turn may
inﬂuence the participation of women in these ﬁelds. Of course,
we acknowledge this is not the only possible pathway here; our
mediation analyses were designed to test an a priori hypothesis
regarding how ability beliefs relate to representation, but they
cannot determine directionality. Similarly, causality regarding
ability beliefs and female representation cannot be claimed from
the current studies due to the correlational nature of the data.
However, our theoretical model posits that ability beliefs do drive
women’s career and educational choices, and recent experimen-
tal manipulations in our lab have provided evidence consistent
with this causal claim (e.g., Cimpian et al., 2014). For instance,
simply describing a novel educational or professional opportu-
nity as requiring raw talent (vs. dedication) was suﬃcient to lower
women’s—and even young girls’—motivation to pursue it. Thus,
there is some independent evidence suggesting that the relation-
ship between ability beliefs and female representation is due to
the causal inﬂuence of the ability beliefs.
Further investigating the precise pathways by which non-
academics’ ability beliefs inﬂuence participation is one important
topic for future research. To begin, it is worth noting that young
men and women often decide whether or not to pursue a ﬁeld
long before interacting with professors, graduate students, or
any other active practitioners of that ﬁeld (e.g., Watt and Eccles,
2008). Indeed, many ﬁelds with disproportionately high repre-
sentation of men at the Ph.D. level see gender disparities in
interest as early as elementary school (Lubinski and Benbow,
2006; Ceci andWilliams, 2010; Cvencek et al., 2011). From our
viewpoint, some of these early diﬀerences may be due to the abil-
ity beliefs of people outside of academia (teachers, parents, peers,
etc.). For example, adults’ FABs, in combination with the stereo-
type that females are less likely than males to be brilliant, could
lead to small diﬀerences in the extent to which adults encourage
girls’ and boys’ interest in ﬁelds believed to require this intellec-
tual trait, the extent to which they provide boys and girls with
opportunities to develop their skills in these ﬁelds, the extent to
which they dwell on boys’ and girls’ achievements in these ﬁelds,
and so on. Adults are also likely to convey their FABs to the chil-
dren themselves. Once absorbed, these beliefs might make it more
diﬃcult for girls to consider careers in ﬁelds believed to require
brilliance (again, since the ambient stereotypes portray them as
being unsuited for these ﬁelds). As well, children might commu-
nicate these FABs to their peers, either via explicit statements or
more subtly—say, by reacting with surprise to behaviors that are
inconsistent with these beliefs. As a result of these multiple par-
allel processes, young women may be less likely to be interested
in “brilliance-required” ﬁelds, and those who do pursue them
may be less likely to persist and achieve at the same levels as
men.
In summary, we have provided support for the FAB
hypothesis, demonstrating that women tend to be under-
represented in ﬁelds believed to require innate intellectual
talent for success. Our data also open up possibilities for
future research on the pathways by which ability beliefs
inﬂuence women’s participation. Finally, these studies point
to possibilities for eﬀective interventions. If the practition-
ers of ﬁelds with gender gaps made a concerted eﬀort to
highlight the role of sustained, long-term eﬀort in achieve-
ment, the gender gaps in these ﬁelds may correspondingly be
diminished.
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